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Abstract
This paper seeks to expand our understanding of initial trust by looking at how vari-
ation in risk influences the nature of trust and the process of initial trust formation.
Four hypotheses were tested in two experiments involving participants with and
without work experience. A first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship
between a general propensity to trust and initial trust; a second hypothesis, a nega-
tive relationship between risk and initial trust; whereas a third hypothesis posited
that risk would increase the importance participants place on benevolence and
integrity. A fourth hypothesis suggested that risk would have a positive and moder-
ating influence on the effect of out-of-role behavior when presented after role-
conformant in-role behavior. Findings are presented and discussed and practical
implications suggested.
Introduction
How does initial trust form between individuals in organiza-
tions? Understanding initial trust formation is important
for two reasons: First, even long-term relationships begin
with initial trust and initial trust tends to shape subsequent
interaction through its effects on expectations (Vlaar, Van
den Bosch & Volberda, 2007). Second, initial trust situations,
situations where people meet and need to interact with and
cooperate with new and unknown individuals, have become
more prevalent as a result of increased reliance on tempo-
rary work groups (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006), restructuring
(Falkenberg, Stensaker, Meyer, & Haueng, 2005), and
increased use of external consultants (McKenna, 2006).
Some of these relationships never develop beyond a short
term relationship.
Trust is defined here as the“willingness of a party to be vul-
nerable to the actions of another party based on the expecta-
tion that the other will perform a particular action important
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control
that other party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 713).
Trust may be based on a trustor’s evaluation of the trustee’s
ability, benevolence, integrity, and most usually a combina-
tion of the three (Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995). Ability
can be defined as“that groupof skills, competencies and char-
acteristics that enable a party to have influence within some
specific domain” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 717). Benevolence is
“. . . the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do
good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive”
(Mayer et al., 1995, p. 718). Integrity is that “. . . a trustee
adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable”
(Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). Trust between different situations
is likely to differ in their emphasis on ability, benevolence,
and integrity. Trust in some situations may be about ability,
whereas trust in other situations may be about benevolence
and integrity (Kramer, 1996). Initial trust here refers to trust
in the initial stages of a relationship where the parties have no
or little experience with the other (McKnight & Chervany,
2006;McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998).
Experimental findings as well as case studies suggest that
people do trust and manage to work with people they have
little or no prior knowledge about (Meyerson, Weick, &
Kramer, 1996; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Ostrom, 2003; Weber,
Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). Several contributions as a
result has sought to explain how initial trust forms.McKnight
et al. (1998) thus see initial trust as based on a combination of
dispositional, cognitive, and institutional factors. McKnight
et al. (1998) argue that initial trust is enabledbyaperson’sdis-
position to trust, including his or her faith in humanity and
stance toward trusting strangers (Rotter, 1967). Initial trust
is also made possible by a trustor’s beliefs that the necessary
institutional structures (e.g., contracts, courts) are in place
to protect one’s interests (Giddens, 1991; Lane, 1998) and by
the trustor’s experience that a situation is normal and intelli-
gible (Garfinkel, 1963; Zucker, 1986). Finally, McKnight
et al. suggest that initial trust is facilitated by categorization
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processes that enable a trustor to import assumptions based
on the trustee’s unit membership (e.g., belonging to the same
organization; Williams, 2001) or profession (Barber, 1983).
Meyerson et al. (1996) likewise described initial or swift trust
in temporary work groups as enabled by reliable professional
role performance, reputation effects, or people guarding their
reputation within a limited pool of contractors, as well as the
reputation of the contractor. Both contributions see initial
trust as being based on a perception of the trustee being reli-
able, predictable, and able. Thus, initial trust in these contri-
butions resembles what Lewicki and Bunker (1996) refer to
as calculative trust and McAllister (1995) as cognitive-based
trust.
These contributions offer valuable insight on initial trust
formation.Yet, they also have multiple problems: Their focus
is on describing antecedents to initial trust to explain a phe-
nomenon; initial trust. The contributions however fail to
explain when people are likely to attend to different informa-
tion sources. The models explain, but do not predict.
While initial trust is differentiated from trust produced
in established relationships, contributions on initial trust
has little to say about the effects of the trustor’s situation
on initial trust and initial trust formation (McKnight &
Chervany, 2006). While risk is not discussed extensively, the
emphasis on reliability, predictability, and ability in these
descriptions resemble the trust characteristic of the initial
low-risk, low-commitment interactions (Lewicki & Bunker,
1996). Thus, risk in the initial stages is assumed to be
moderate to low.
This assumes that relationships start with small to moder-
ate levels of risk and that risk results from people’s discre-
tionary choices. People initially abstain from committing
themselves to a relationship and gradually raise their invest-
ments in the relationships as they gain experience with the
trustee (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Risk and dependence
however is often ingrained in the structure of the situation
irrespective of a trustor’s choices. People thus often find
themselves depending on people they may not even know,
and people’s knowledge of that relationship is likely to influ-
ence the initial interaction (Selart, 2010).
We define risk here as “. . . the extent to which there is
uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or
disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized” (Sitkin
& Pablo, 1992, p. 10). Risk has three dimensions: outcome
uncertainty or the variability of outcomes; lack of knowledge
of the distribution of potential outcomes; and the uncontrol-
lability of the outcome potential (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).
Outcome expectations refer to the expected outcomes of a
decision or action. Outcome potential refers to the possible
range of outcomes as represented in questions like “How bad
could it get”or“Howmuch could Iwin.”Wewill concern our-
selves with variation in the negative outcome potential, as
expressed in “how bad could it get.”
Studies of romantic as well as professional relationships
suggest that the nature and type of dependence between a
trustor anda trustee influence thenature of trust orwhat trust
is about. Thus hierarchical position (at the bottom or at the
top) influences the importance a trustor place onbenevolence
or ability (Kramer, 1996). Different relationships similarly
tend to emphasize different dimensions depending on the
degree of dependence (Fiske, 1992; Sheppard & Sherman,
1998). Generalizing from this, we suggest that risk is likely to
vary evenwithin initial trust situations and that this variation
is likely to influence what trust is about. As a result, existing
contributions on initial trust formationbynot including vari-
ation in risk, is likely to restrict our understanding of initial
trust and initial trust formation. Descriptions of initial trust
formation in situations involving low to moderate levels of
risk may not generalize to high-risk situations. Here, we seek
to expand our understanding of initial trust formation by
exploring the effects that variation in risk has on the content
of trust, or what trust is about and related to this, how initial
trust forms.
In studying the process of initial trust formation, we will
be interested in the effects of in-role vs. out-of-role behavior
on initial trust. In-role behavior here refers to the behavior
expected of a professional role incumbent, whereas out-of-
role behavior refers to behavior that is not associated with or
expected from a role incumbent (Guiot, 1977). Initial trust
is often viewed as facilitated by a reliable professional in-
role behavior (Barber, 1983; Meyerson et al., 1996). Thus,
Meyerson et al. (1996) posit that role-based interaction “. . .
leads to more rapid development of trust than does person-
based interaction” (181). Inconsistent role behavior on
the other hand raises questions about the reliability of the
trustee and slows the development of trust (Meyerson et al.,
1996). Other contributions however suggest that sanctioned
behavior (in-role behavior) is less informative about the true
intentions of a trustee and hence less influential for eliciting
trust (Luhmann, 1979). According to Luhmann “. . . role-
conformity offers little opportunity for the presentation of
self. Anyone who merely conforms will not be seen as self at
all, and therefore can be trusted as little as the person who
hurries past” (Luhmann, 1979).
In the rest of the paper, we proceed by developing four
hypotheses: A first hypothesis posits a positive relationship
between a general propensity to trust and initial trust. The
second hypothesis proposes a negative direct relationship
between risk and initial trust. A third hypothesis states that
risk will influence the content of trust, increasing the impor-
tance trustors attach to a trustee’s benevolence and integrity
and finally, a fourth hypothesis states that risk will influence
the effect of out-of-role behavior where out-of-role behavior
follows after in-role behavior. The next section then intro-
duces two experiments involving two different samples, and
presents findings and null findings from the experiments.
1186 The effects of risk on initial trust formation
© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 1185–1199
Finally, the last section includes a discussion of findings and
no findings, limitations, as well as practical implications.
Figure 1 shows the research model.
Hypotheses
Trust has long been linked to a general propensity to trust or a
general, stable, within-person factor that influences willing-
ness to trust others across situations and contexts (Mayer
et al., 1995; Rotter, 1967, 1971).A propensity to trust is based
on early trust-related experiences. People’s extrapolations
from these early experiences develop into general beliefs
about other people that eventually take the form of a trait or
personality characteristic (Erikson, 1968; Rotter, 1971).
Empirical findings however have failed to find a strong and
convincing general relationship between a general propensity
to trust and trust (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982). Several
contributors as a result have suggested a contingent relation-
ship in which a general propensity to trust influence trust in
situations where people have little or no specific information
at hands.Where people have access tomore specific informa-
tion through experience or secondary information, people
rely on this information (Gill, Boies, Finegan, & McNally,
2005).
Mayer et al. (1995) thus suggest that a trustor’s propensity
to trustwill influence a trustor’s trust in a trustee, in the initial
stages of a relationship, before the trustor has attained any
information on the trustee. In the absence of more concrete
data about the trustee, people fill in withmore general expec-
tations. Later, as a trustor gain more specific information
about the trustee, general expectations becomes less impor-
tant. A slightly different yet related argument is provided
by Gill et al. (2005) who relates the influence of a general
propensity to trust on the strength of the situation (Gill
et al., 2005;Mischel, 1977):Weak situations are characterized
by having“. . . highly ambiguous behavioral cues that provide
few constraints on behavior, and do not induce uniform
expectations” (Gill et al., 2005, p. 293). Strong situations on
the other hand have “. . . salient behavioral cues that lead eve-
ryone to interpret the circumstances similarly, and induce
uniform expectations regarding the appropriate response”
(Gill et al., 2005, p. 293). In well-defined strong situations,
Gill et al. suggest, propensity to trust is likely to be over-
whelmed by the situation and the specific experiences of the
trustor. Initial trust situations provide trustors with little
information about a trustee and normally imply weak situa-
tions with ambiguous cues and unclear expectations.
Hypothesis 1. Propensity to trust will show a positive
relationship with initial trust.
The relationship between risk and trust has been conceived of
in different ways. First, some see a direct correspondence
between perceived risk and subjective trust: According to Das
andTeng (2004),“subjective trust refers to assessed probabili-
ties of having performed desirable action by the trustee,”
whereas perceived risk is “the assessed probabilities of not
having desirable results” (98–99). Thus, perceived risk and
subjective trust can be seen as inverse properties.High subjec-
tive risk equals low trust, whereas low subjective risk equals
high trust (Das & Teng, 2004).
Mayer et al. (1995) on the other hand see risk as a situ-
ational feature that moderate the relationship between trust
and risk taking in relationship. In their model, perceived risk
is described as“a trustor’s beliefs about gains or losses outside
of the relationship with a particular trustee” (1995, p. 726).
The trustor compares the level of trust with the level of risk.
Where the level of trust surpasses the level of perceived risk,
people will engage in risk taking in relationships. Where the
level of perceived risk surpasses the level of trust, people
abstain from risk taking in relationship. Risk in this model
does not influence trust as a willingness to be vulnerable, but
ultimately influence behavior.
We still believe however that risk is likely to reduce trust for
several reasons.
Afirst reason reflects theway trust ismeasured.Mayer et al.
define trust as a trustor’s willingness to engage in risk taking
and measure trust accordingly as a trustor’s willingness to
engage in risk taking in relationships. The consequences of
engaging in the sort of risk taking in relationship captured in
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Figure 1 Research model.
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the trust scale (a representative item from the trust scale is “I
would be comfortable giving the consultant a task or problem
which was critical for me, even if I could not monitor their
action”) are likely to be greater for vulnerable trustors (who
stand a high chance of actually losing their job).
Second, risk is likely to activate the behavioral inhibition
system (Macleod & Mathews, 1988), increasing people’s
sensitivity to threats and punishments (MacLeod&Mathews,
1988). The behavioral inhibition system further causes
people to perceive threats in ambiguous stimuli and situa-
tions (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). A general effect of the
behavioral inhibition system is to inhibit behavior that could
cause negative or painful outcomes and inhibit movements
toward goals. As a result, risk, by activating the behavioral
inhibition, is likely to reduce trust by sensitizing people to
threats and aversive outcomes and inhibit goal-strivings. Risk
is also likely to activate a predecisional, deliberative mindset
(Gollwitzer,Heckhausen,&Steller, 1990;Taylor&Gollwitzer,
1995).Apredecisional,deliberativemindset implies a preven-
tion focus in which people seek to avoid negative outcomes
as opposed to approach positive outcomes (Higgins, 1997;
Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, &Molden, 2003) and is asso-
ciatedwith deliberative, effortful, and controlled information
processing (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Gollwitzer et al., 1990;
Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). People in a deliberative mind state
pay greater attention to unexpected, incongruous, and poten-
tially individuating information (Erber & Fiske, 1984),
thus increasing the likelihood that a trustor will find negative
or disconcerting information about a trustee. A deliberate
mindset also has other consequences that are likely to under-
mine trust: Thus, a deliberativemindset reduces or eliminates
the illusion of control biases, which otherwise characterizes a
post-decisional, implemental mindset and leads to worsened
mood states, as well as increasing people’s perception of risk
(Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995).
Hypothesis 2. There will be a negative relationship
between risk and initial trust.
Risk influences not only the level of trust but even what trust
is about. People in different circumstances are likely to attach
different importance to ability, benevolence, and integrity
(Mayer et al., 1995).Different social situations present people
with different opportunities and different threats and imply
the relevance of specific needs and motives (Holmes, 2002;
Kelley et al., 2002; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). The structure
of social situations can be described in terms of level of
dependence or the degree to which an individual’s outcomes
are influenced by his or her interaction partner’s actions
(Kelley et al., 2002).Mutuality of dependence is the extent to
which two individuals are equally dependent on each other
(mutual dependence) or one partner is comparatively more
reliant on the other (nonmutual dependence).Covariation of
interests describes the extent to which an outcome that ben-
efits one interaction partner also benefits the other. Perfectly,
correspondent situations imply that outcomes that benefit
one partner also benefit the other. Mixed-motive situations
imply some common and some conflicting interests. Finally,
some situations may have perfectly conflicting outcomes in
which one partner’s gain is the other partner’s loss (Holmes,
2002; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).
Different situations afford or allow for the expression of
different traits. Situations characterized by high, nonmutual
dependence, and conflicting interests afford the expression of
prosocial motives, responsiveness, benevolence, integrity, as
well as the opposite, narrow, self-serving behavior (Holmes,
2002). In contrast, situations characterized by low to moder-
ate, mutual dependence, and nonconflicting interests (both
partners seek the sameoutcome) afford the expression of reli-
ability and ability but not benevolence.
Risk is likely to change the structural properties of a
situation.
Risk in the form of a negative outcome potential (e.g.,
losing a job) is likely to influence the relationship to an inter-
action partner, particularly where this person is viewed as
being able to influence the outcome or possess what is com-
monly referred to as fate control. More specifically, risk is
likely to increase nonmutual dependence and accentuate con-
flicting interests (as onepartnermust attend to the interests of
the organization and the other worries about her job). Risk as
a result, we suggest, will increase a trustor’s concern with the
responsiveness, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee. In
accordancewith this,Kramer (1996) shows howdoctoral stu-
dents (highly dependent on their professors) were concerned
with their professors’ care or benevolence,whereas professors
(less dependent on their doctoral students) were more
focused on doctoral students’ reliability or ability. Similarly,
Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985) find that high depend-
ence in romantic relationships trigger questions about
responsiveness. Sheppard and Sherman (1998), building on
Fiske’s work on relationship schemas (Fiske, 1992), show
how the nature of dependence (shallow vs. deep dependence)
raises attention to different dimensions of trustworthiness.
Thus relationships characterized by deep dependence (e.g.,
authority ranking) introduces the risks of cheating, abuse,
neglect, or threats to self-esteem and evokes a concern with a
trustee’s (e.g., the boss) integrity, concern, or benevolence.
Hypothesis 3. Greater risk will be associated with a
greater emphasis on benevolence and integrity.
The content of trust or what trust is aboutwe argue, influence
how initial trust forms and more specifically the effect of
social information (in-role vs. out-of-role behavior) on
initial trust. People seek to reduce uncertainty with respect to
the dimensions that mitigate for the salient risks that people
face in a specific situation (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).
In situations where the prime concern is with the trustee’s
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competence, people seek to discern information about the
ability of the trustee, whereas in other situations where
people confide their innermost secrets, the trustees’ integrity
and willingness to keep their word of not spreading that
information is likely to be central.
Here, we suggest that peoples’ exposure to risk and their
vulnerability in the situation is likely to influence peoples’
responses to in-role vs. out-of-role behavior. Hypothesis 2
posits that risk will increase the importance trustors attach to
benevolence and integrity.
Ability is consistent with the consultant role and readily
discernible through a trustee’s in-role behavior. A consultant
has incentives for performing well and no interests in con-
cealing his or her ability.Enacting the role of a consultantmay
in itself convey an impression of ability based on assumptions
of stringent selection criteria (Gambetta, 1988). In contrast,
benevolence and integrity relates to a trustee’s intentions and
choices in situations that involve trade-offs and conflicting
interests, as well as weak situations that provide few con-
straints on behavior (Mischel, 1977). Benevolence and integ-
rity is defined by how a trustee behave when it is not in the
trustee’s interest to respond to some ones’ need or abide to a
moral code. Sanctioned and constrained in-role behavior
provides few cues as of the true intentions of the trustee.
Out-of-role or role-incongruent behavior, or behavior that
goes against expectations and role expectations, is likely to be
much more revealing about the true intentions and hence
about the benevolence and integrity of the trustee (Ajzen,
1971; Gilbert, 1998; Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961).
Brief exposure to a trustee is unlikely to provide a trustor
with definitive answers about the trustee’s trustworthiness.
Still, we posit that even brief episodes can inform initial trust.
Kramer (1994) thus found that merely ruminating about
someone’s motives and intentions increased an individual’s
confidence in the accuracy of his or her judgment about
another person. In a similar vein,Davis and Kotteman (1994)
found that merely watching someone led people to overin-
flate confidence in their own judgment. People moreover
are likely to be sensitive to the extent of which information
help further their informational goals, that is, provide infor-
mation about someone’s ability or intentions (benevolence
and integrity). In a series of experiments, Ferguson andBargh
(2004) found that participants actively engaged in goal
pursuit compared to participants not engaged in goal pursuit,
evaluated goal-relevant objects more favorably than goal-
irrelevant objects. Extending on this, goal-relevant infor-
mation should also be evaluated more favorably than
goal-irrelevant information. Finally, in a different set of
experiments, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) demonstrate how
incidental emotions influence trust in unrelated settings.
Positive emotions including happiness and gratitude increase
trust,whereas anger decreases trust.The influence of inciden-
tal emotions on trust that the authors find is limited to situa-
tions where the trustor is unaware of the source of their
emotions as well as situations where the trustor is not too
familiar with the trustee.
We suggest that a positive effect of out-of-role behavior
will manifest itself only where this out-of-role behavior
follows after role-congruent in-role behavior.Two arguments
support this claim. First, Sheppard and Sherman (1998)
argue that risks in relationships are cumulative “so that deep
interdependence entails all of the risks of shallow depend-
ence, deep dependence and shallow interdependence” (432).
As a result, the need for mitigating properties are likely to
follow a similar cumulative ordering in that deep dependence
for instance entail both a need for ability and reliability
but also benevolence and integrity (Shapiro, Sheppard &
Cheraskin, 1992; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). Second, in
order to establish meaning from potentially diagnostics
out-of-role behavior, a trustor may first need to establish the
situation as real, intersubjectively shared, and having an
obdurate character (Garfinkel, 1963; Turner, 2002; Zucker,
1986). In-role behavior help establish a sense of normalcy.
Without this sense of normalcy, people may be incapable
to attend to and make sense of potentially trait-diagnostic
role-incongruent out-of-role behavior. Inconsistency argue
Rempel et al. (1985) threaten the establishment of trust
because “. . . it raises the specter of a partner who is volatile
and acts in unexpected, irregular ways” (p. 99).
Hypothesis 4. Perceived risk will moderate the effects
of out-of-role behavior when out-of-role behavior
follows after in-role behavior. People experiencing
higher risk will compared to people experiencing lesser
risk respondmore favorably to out-of-role behavior.
Study 1
Method
Two concerns were paramount to the design. First, a primary
concern was to establish the causal effects of risk and infor-
mation on the formation of trust, thus motivating the choice
of an experimental design. Second, we also sought to repre-
sent the type of risk people face in actual change processes.As
our study deals with the effect of information in ambiguous
situations, we sought to recreate some of that ambiguity.
Experiments in the form of one time or repeated trust games
present participants with unambiguous feedback as in the
formof cooperate vs. defect.The crucial issue here however, is
how people respond to ambiguous as opposed to unambigu-
ous information, in a situation where the actual intent of the
other party is open to multiple interpretations. To recreate
this type of situation,we developed a set of scenarios describ-
ing both a context (the restructuring of a production
plant) and two different but ultimately inconclusive episodes,
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involving a meeting with a consultant. Study 1 included par-
ticipants currentlyworking andwith substantial work experi-
ence (the practitioner sample), whereas Study 2 included
full-time students with little or no work experience (the
student sample). The samples can be described as conven-
ience samples. The experiments were carried out in conjunc-
tion with classes and permission with permission from the
instructors. While participation was entirely voluntary, very
few chose not to participate in the experiments.
Sample
The practitioner sample in Study 1 consisted of 122 individu-
als who were working full time at the time when the experi-
ment was carried out. Of these, the majority were taking
classes in part-time degree programs for working profession-
als at a Norwegian business school. 52.5% were women, and
46.7% men (the remaining gave no information). The mean
age was 38 (SD = 8.6) with the youngest 18 and the oldest 58.
Average work experience was 14.6 years (SD = 8.9) ranging
from no experience to 35 years.
Procedure and materials
The experiment was preceded by a short introduction
and instructions that were replicated on the first page of the
questionnaire. The participants spent approximately 25–30
minutes completing the experiment. All manipulations and
instructions were provided in the form of written texts and
instructions provided in the questionnaire. Participants were
introduced to a scenario of an imminent reorganization of a
production company and asked to see themselves as working
for a local unit of that company.The possible consequences of
the reorganization for the unit they were told could go both
ways—the unit could receive more resources, be downsized,
or altogether disbanded. To assist the management in devel-
oping the change proposal, the management had hired a
consultant with extensive experience and expertise who was
expected to exert considerable influence on the final decision.
The participants wouldworkwith the consultant on develop-
ing a change proposal, as representatives of their unit. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to a high- or low-risk group.
Risk was manipulated through instructions, which described
the situation of the participant.
The high-risk manipulation informed the participants
that they were likely to lose the job and would have difficulty
finding new employment,whereas the low-riskmanipulation
informed the participants that they were unlikely to lose the
job and would have little difficulty finding new employment.
The low-risk manipulation read:
You have been in the organization for 5 years. You do
not expect your position to be substantially affected
by the changes that the organization will be going
through.You do however expect to spend a substantial
amount of time on the project. In the case that your
position should be affected or disappear, you would
not expect to have any difficulties of finding a new
job within the same company or possibly for another
company. You look upon the prospects of a change of
work as exciting. At the time you have not yet estab-
lished yourself at your current work-location.
The high-risk manipulation read:
You have been in the organization for 15 years. You
have spent substantial amount of time on acquiring the
skills of your present job. Your position is one of the
positions expected to be affected by the mentioned
changes. Over time you have acquired a substantial
amount of competence within your area. The need for
this competence outside of the company however is
limited. A change in career would at the same time
mean that you have to learn a range of new skills. You
have settled downwith a family and built a house in the
vicinity of the company.Amovewould thus imply con-
siderable costs for you and your family.
A scale measuring the participant’s subjective experience of
the risk (subjective risk scale) and the first of three identical
trust-in-the-consultant scales followed immediately after the
risk manipulation. The participants were then introduced to
two behavioral episodes involving the consultant. The first
episode was designed to be informative about the personal
traits of the consultant (the out-of-role behavior), whereas
the second episode was designed to be informative about the
professional role of the consultant (the in-role behavior).The
last manipulation reversed the order in which the episodes
(out-of-role and in-role) were introduced.
The out-of-role behavior read:
In a later meeting the consultant unexpectedly says. “I
personallymean that themanagement of this company
ought to get more involved in this process.”You notice
that this deviates from the official communication of
the consultancy.
The in-role behavior read:
In the first meeting the consultant says the following:
“We have been through an evaluation of the process
so far and found that the project needs more involve-
ment frommanagementof thecompany.”Youareaware
that the consultancy tends to do this type of process-
evaluations. (“In the first . . .” and“In the second.”were
changed depending upon the order in which the events
were introduced).
The participants rated how informative the events were with
respect to the role of the consultant and the personal qualities
and motivations of the consultant before completing a
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trust-in-the-consultant scale. The next section then had the
participants rate the importance of a series of properties asso-
ciated with the consultant, for their trust in the consultant.
Twelve items captured the dimensions of ability, benevolence,
and integrity (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995). A
series of control questions and a trusting propensity scale
(Mayer & Davis, 1999; Rotter, 1967) completed the experi-
ment.The participants were finally debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
The experiment applied a combination of new and estab-
lished scales. The trust scale was adopted from Mayer and
Davis (1999) and slightly adjusted to fit in with the specific
context described in the experiment. The adjustments
included changing the referents of trust (from top manage-
ment to consultant), as well as adding a global item (“I trust
the consultant”) to capture nuances in trust possibly not cap-
tured by the other four items. Three scales for the importance
of ability, benevolence, and integrity were developed from
similar belief scales in Mayer and Davis (1999). Other scales,
including a subjective risk scale and the scales for role- and
person-diagnostic value were developed specifically for the
experiment. The number of items in the importance scales
(ability, benevolence, and integrity) was reduced from 6 to 4.
Seven-point Likert scales were used throughout the experi-
ment. The wording of the scales were completely disagree or
completely agree (at 1 and 7, respectively) and (for the impor-
tance scales) of very little importance and highly important (at
1 and 7, respectively).
Cronbach’s alphas for initial trust (.66), as well as for the
“propensity to trust”scale (.72),were on the low side, yet con-
sistent with previous findings (Mayer & Davis, 1999). The
integrity scale displayed low reliability (Cronbach’s alphas of
.54).Cronbach’s alphas for variables ranged from .54 (impor-
tance of integrity) to .92 (subjective risk).
Manipulation checks
The risk manipulations were assessed by means of a t-test.
The difference in subjective risk (group means) between the
high-risk and the low-risk manipulation groups was in the
expected direction and highly significant (Mhigh risk = 4.13
[SD = .83],Mlow risk = 2.51 [SD = .86]), t(120) = 10.58, p < .001.
Results
Hypothesis 1
No significant relationship was observed between a general
propensity to trust and initial trust in the practitioner sample,
r = .08, ns (n = 122).
Hypothesis 2
The two experimental groups differed markedly in their
initial toward the consultant. Participants exposed to the high
condition displayed less initial trust,M = 3.25, SD = .94, than
participants in the low-risk condition, M = 3.95, SD = 1.01.
This difference was highly significant, t(120) = -4.01,
p < .001. The subjective risk score (based on participants
subjective experience of risk in the situation) showed a
strong and significant negative relationship with initial trust,
r = -.46,R2adjusted = .205, p < .001 (n = 122).
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3was tested through t tests for differences in inde-
pendent group means. Linear regressions were performed
between themanipulation checks of risk to determine the size
of the effect of risk on the importancemeasures (R2adjusted).The
first part of the hypothesis was supported (the relationship
between risk and the importance of benevolence), but not the
second (the relationship between risk and importance of
integrity).Participants exposed to thehigh-riskmanipulation
placed greater importance on benevolence compared to par-
ticipants who were exposed to the low-risk manipulation.
Mean scores for the importance of benevolence in the
two experimental groups were 5.05 (SD = 1.00) and 4.41
(SD = 1.46)forthehigh-andlow-riskgroup,respectively.This
difference was significant, t(119) = 2.44, p < .01 (one-tailed
test). The relationship between the subjective risk score and
importance of benevolence was significant in the practitioner
sample,b = .230,F(1,119) = 6.65 and p < .05,R2adjusted = .045.
No significant difference was found between the experi-
mental groups in the importance attached to integrity. Mean
score for the importance of integrity in the low-risk condition
was 5.48 (SD .81).Mean scores in the high-risk condition was
5.52 (SD .92). t(119) = .262, ns.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 2 was tested in a two-way mixed within-between
analysis of variance with trust as the dependent variable.
Group means are reported in Table 1. Running the analysis
with three subjective risk groups revealed an interaction
effect between risk and time, as suggested by Hypothesis 2.
With three subjective risk groups, there was nomain effect of
time, Wilk’s lambda = 1.00, F(1,78) = .014, p = .907, partial
eta square = .000. More importantly however, a significant
interaction effect was observed between subjective risk and
Table 1 Means of Participants’ Trust by Subjective Risk and Time in
Study 1
T1 T2
M SD M SD
High subjective risk (n = 25) 3.02 .93 3.45 1.21
Medium subjective risk (n = 25) 3.82 1.19 3.60 1.24
Low subjective risk (n = 31) 4.05 .95 3.88 1.03
Total (n = 81) 3.66 1.10 3.66 1.15
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time, Wilk’s lambda = .888, F(2,78) = 4.93, p = .010, partial
eta square = .112, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. A signifi-
cant between-subjects effect was further observed for sub-
jective risk on trust, F(2,78) = 3.612, p = .032, partial eta
square = .085.
Discussion
Hypothesis 1, that there would be a positive relationship
between a general propensity to trust and initial trust, was
not supported. Hypothesis 2, suggesting a negative direct
relationship between risk and initial trust, was supported.
Hypothesis 3, positing that risk would increase the impor-
tance attached to benevolence and integrity, was supported
for benevolence but not integrity. Finally, Hypothesis 4, sug-
gesting an interaction effect between subjective risk and the
effect of out-of-role behavior when introduced after the
in-role behavior, was supported.
Study 2
Method
Sample
The student sample in Study 2 consisted of 148 full-time stu-
dents most of whom were in their second year of an under-
graduate business degree program at a Norwegian business
school. The majority of the students were in their early twen-
ties. The experiment was carried out in conjunction with a
mandatory course in organizational psychology held for
second year students. 35.4% were women and 64.6% men.
Mean age of the student sample was 22 years (SD = 1.37).The
majority of the individuals in the student sample hadnowork
experience. The distribution was as follows: 103 had no work
experience, 27 had 1 year of work experience, 9 had 2 years, 4
had 3 years, and 4 had five or more years of work experience.
Procedure and materials
Themanipulations andmaterials used in Study 2were identi-
cal to the manipulations and materials used in Study 1. The
participants completed the experiment in conjunction with a
lecture ina large auditorium(400 seats).As for thefirst experi-
ment, the experiment was preceded by a short introduction
and instructions that were replicated on the first page of the
questionnaire. Like in Study 1, participants in Study 2 spent
approximately 25–30 minutes completing the questionnaire.
Allmanipulationsandinstructionswere in the formofwritten
texts and instructions provided in the questionnaire.
Manipulation checks
As in Study 1, the risk manipulations were assessed by
means of a t-test. The difference in subjective risk (group
means) between the high-risk and the low-risk manipulation
groups was in the expected direction and highly significant
(Mhigh risk = 4.13 [SD .72], Mlow risk = 2.45 [SD = .71]), t(145) =
14.26, p < .001.
Results
Hypothesis 1
Unlike in the practitioner sample, there was a strong and
significant relationship between a general propensity to trust
and initial trust, r = .239,R2adjusted = .09, p < .01 (n = 145).
Hypothesis 2
Like in the practitioner sample, there was a significant differ-
ence between the experimental groups in their initial trust
toward the consultant. Again, the difference went in the
hypothesized direction. Participants exposed to the high-risk
manipulation displayed less initial trust, M = 3.45, SD = .97,
than the low-risk group, M = 3.91, SD = .86. Again, this dif-
ference was highly significant, t(144) = -3.02, p < .1. As with
the practitioner sample, the subjective risk score showed a
strong (albeit somewhat weaker) and significant negative
relationship with initial trust, r = -.26,R2adjusted = .09, p < .001
(n = 146).
Hypothesis 3
The analyses for Hypotheses 1 in Study 2 were identical to
the analyses in Study 1. Hypothesis 1a and b was supported
although the differences between the groups were small,
barely reaching conventional levels of significance. For
benevolence, themeans for the high- vs. low-risk groups were
5.01 (SD = 1.20) and 4.69 (SD = 1.12), t(143) = 1.69, p < .05
(one-tailed test). As in the practitioner sample, there was
a significant relationship between risk and importance of
benevolence in the student sample, b = .185, F(1, 143) = 2.25
and p < .05, R2adjusted = .028. Again, no significant difference
was found between the experimental groups in the impor-
tance attached to integrity. Mean score for the importance of
integrity in the low-risk condition was 5.51 (SD .73) in the
low-risk condition and 5.60 (SD .71). t(144) = -.711, ns, in
the high-risk condition.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 received no support in Study 2. Running the
analysiswith three subjective riskgroups revealeda significant
main effect of time, Wilk’s lambda = .896, F(1,81) = 9.409,
p = .003, partial eta square = .104.Groupmeans can be found
in Table 2. No support was found for Hypothesis 4 in that no
significant interaction effect was observed between time and
subjective risk,Wilk’s lambda = .999,F(1,81) = .056,p = .946,
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partial eta square = .001. There was no significantmain effect
of risk,F(1,81) = 1.213,p = .303,partial eta square .029.
Discussion
Hypothesis 1, positing a positive relationship between a
general propensity to trust and initial trust was supported in
the student sample. Hypothesis 2, suggesting a negative rela-
tionship between subjective risk and initial trust was also sup-
ported. Hypothesis 3 positing that risk would increase the
importance attached to benevolence and integrity was again
supported for benevolence but not integrity. Finally unlike in
the practitioner sample, Hypothesis 4, suggesting an interac-
tion effect between subjective risk and the effect of out-of-
role behavior when introduced after the in-role behavior,
found no support in the student sample.
General discussion
The results thus show partial support for Hypothesis 1 of a
positive relationship between a propensity to trust and initial
trust: The expected relationship was not observed for the
practitioner sample (in which participants had extensive
work experience) butwas found in the student sample (where
participants had limited to none work experience). Hypoth-
esis 2, positing a negative relationship between risk and initial
trust found support with both samples.
Hypothesis 3, suggesting that risk would increase the
importance attached to benevolence and integrity, was sup-
ported for benevolence in both samples.No support however
was found for a similar relationship between risk and integ-
rity in either of the samples.Hypothesis 4 suggesting an inter-
action effect between out-of-role behavior and perceived risk
on initial trust found support in the practitioner sample but
not in the student sample.
The contrasting findings for Hypothesis 1 between the two
samples are interesting. In both cases, practitioners and stu-
dents had very limited experience with the trustee. One pos-
sible explanation for the differences is that participants in
the practitioner sample were more familiar with the type of
situation described in the scenario (a reorganization and a
meeting with a consultant) and experienced this situation as
stronger andmore well defined than students with little or no
work experience. This suggests a distinction between experi-
ence with a trustee and situation strength:A trustormay have
little actual experience about a trustee, yet experience a situa-
tion as strong and well defined. A trustor’s familiarity with a
well-defined situation enables the trustor to focus on the
trustee and his or her behavior while reducing the impact of
more general beliefs on initial trust.
As posited in Hypothesis 2, risk did have a significant
and negative effect on initial trust. Future experiments
will need to delineate the actual mechanisms through which
risk reduces trust and their relative contribution to the
relationship.
Hypothesis 3 suggesting a positive relationship between
subjective risk and the importance of benevolence and integ-
rity was supported for benevolence. The effects of risk on the
importance of benevolence were modest and run counter to
the notion of risk radically changing the nature of trust.
Several factors may explain the relatively modest effect of
risk on the importance ratings. First, the weak effects may
be attributed to weak manipulations (Perdue & Summers,
1986).A closer inspection reveals amoremarked effect on the
importance ratings of benevolence in the hypothesized direc-
tion, atmore extreme values of subjective risk.Weakmanipu-
lations couldmean that the studies failed to capture the range
of subjective risk in which the suggested effects of risk are
more noticeable (Cook & Campbell, 1979). It is conceivable
then that a more effective risk manipulation by producing
more extreme levels of subjective risk would have produced a
more solid support for the first hypothesis.
Counter to our hypothesis however, risk had no effect on
the importance attached to integrity in either of the samples.
A vulnerable trustor may see a trustee’s responsiveness and
benevolence as more immediately helpful than integrity in
which “. . . a trustee adheres to a set of principles that the
trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). Benevo-
lence here more specifically describes a trustee’s stance
toward the trustor, whereas integrity describes a trustees’
adherence to a general set of values that the trustor finds
acceptable.
The interaction effect between risk and out-of-role behav-
ior posited byHypothesis 4 found support in Study 1with the
practitioner sample but not in Study 2 with the student
sample. The responses to the out-of-role behavior of partici-
pants who reported medium subjective risk (negative
response) differed substantially from the responses of the
participants who reported the highest level of subjective risk
(positive response), thus suggesting an interaction effect
between risk and out-of-role behavior for very high levels of
risk as opposed to more moderate levels of risk. The interac-
tion effect observed in the practitioner sample was not repli-
cated in Study 2 with the student sample. One possible
interpretation would be that the observed interaction effect
observed in the practitioner samplewas a coincidence, imply-
Table 2 Means of Participants’ Trust by Subjective Risk and Time in
Study 2
T1 T2
M SD M SD
High subjective risk (n = 25) 3.55 1.03 3.31 1.13
Medium subjective risk (n = 25) 3.53 .81 3.23 .86
Low subjective risk (n = 31) 3.86 .91 3.56 1.06
Total (n = 81) 3.65 .91 3.36 1.07
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ing low reliability. This would indicate a need for new and
more reliable experiments. However, the failure to replicate
the findings in the student sample could also reflect charac-
teristics of the participants in the student sample. Students in
a business school are pursuing a study that prepares them for
managerial positions. The students as a result may have diffi-
culties adopting the position of a production worker as called
for in the two studies. Instead, given their choice of education,
they could be expected to adopt a “managerial” perspective
on the consultant that emphasize the technical role perform-
ance of the consultant (Howard, 2000; Lopez, Rechner, &
Olson-Buchanan, 2005). Selective recruitment and informal
socialization, in addition to the influence of a business school
curriculum, may all influence business school students to
adopt amanagerial perspective on the case (Ahmeed, Chung,
& Eichenseher, 2003; Lopez et al., 2005; Thorne & Saunders,
2002). The manipulation checks provide few guarantees that
the students have adopted the position implied in the studies.
On the other hand, risk did influence the importance stu-
dents attached to the various dimensions of trustworthiness,
in the case of ability more so than in the case of the practi-
tioner sample.This constituted amore“subtle”manipulation
check than the subjective risk scales.
Support forHypothesis 4 in Study 1,was further substanti-
ated by the relationships between diagnosticity scores (role
and person) and change in trust. As would be expected from
the arguments leading up to Hypothesis 4, we observed a
positive and significant relationship between the partici-
pants’ ratings of the perceived diagnosticity of out-of-role
behavior and the subsequent change in trust where the out-
of-role-behavior was introduced after the in-role behavior.
In the group of medium subjective risk, the pattern was
reversed. For participants experiencing little subjective risk,
we observed no significant relationship between diagnostic-
ity of either role or person and subsequent change in either
of the orders. In situations where people find that little is
at stake, their motivation to allocate cognitive resources
to attending to and processing social information is likely
to be low (Fiske, 1993; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990). This suggests two possible and distinguish-
able effects of risk, one on effort and one effect that stems
from the selective use of interpretive categories. The most
notable contrast in the effect of behavior (in-role and out-of-
role) then should follow from variation in risk within the
range of subjective risk, where people are motivated to pay
attention to social stimuli. These however are highly tentative
interpretations of some of the findings and the suggested
relationships would need to be explored further in new
studies. There was a significant and moderately strong rela-
tion between a general propensity to trust and initial trust in
the student sample, which had little or no work experience
but no corresponding relation in the practitioner sample
where people were currently working and had substantial
work experience. This supports the argument suggested in
the literature (Gill et al., 2005; Rotter, 1967, 1971) that a
general propensity to trust is likely to be influential in shaping
trust in situations where people have little or no domain
experience.
Other alternative variables and mechanisms that may
explain the interaction effect suggested by Hypothesis 4
should be ruled out. More specifically, three alternative
explanations may need to be addressed: A first alternative
explanation is that participants assign specificmeaning to the
events and respond to the content of this assigned meaning
(Dirks & Skarlicki, 2004;Mayer et al., 1995). The participants
then may interpret behavior as informative of the consult-
ant’s stand with respect to different parties and interests.
People experiencing high subjective risk may interpret role-
incongruent, out-of-role behavior as indicative of a consult-
ants’ antagonistic stand toward the management. In a similar
vein, it is possible that the sequencing of the behavior affects
the participants’ substantial interpretation of the behaviors
(Asch, 1946). Second, people may respond to the affective
nature of the stimuli and the extent to which the affective
content of these stimuli matches their own affective state in
that situation (Byrne, 1971; Byrne, Clore, & Smeaton, 1986;
Pinel et al., 2004). Thus, a consultant indicating frustration
by deviating fromprofessional norms (out-of-role-behavior)
may better match the affective state of people experiencing
high subjective risk.
Third, risk may affect people’s willingness to accept risk
with a trustee. People exposed to risk in a situation may be
more inclined to accept and value risky departures from
expected behavior. Because people exposed to risk may have
discounted the prospects associated with the outcomes, they
may see themselves as having less to loose andmore to gain by
what they see as departures from the consultant’s normal
script of behavior.As a result, theymay respondmore favora-
bly to such departures than less exposed, more conservative
trustors and employees.
The effect of risk on people’s decision making can be
broken down in twoparts: First, the situationmay look differ-
ent depending on the amount of risk facing a trustor.Valuing
“risky” out-of-role behavior may be rational for vulnerable
participants as the status quo, represented by a reliable in-role
performance, in itself represents a considerable threat. Vul-
nerable individuals stand to lose more from the status quo
(in-role behavior) and less from deviations from status quo
(as represented by role-incongruent out-of-role-behavior).
Second, the manipulation may lead people to frame the situ-
ation in terms of losses rather than wins. Prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that framing an
outcome in terms of losses increases people’s willingness to
take risk. People experiencing higher subjective risk in their
situation then should be more inclined to accept “risky”
departures from the role expectations associated with the
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trustee. Yet, as previously noted, we find a negative relation
between risk and initial trust, which runs counter to the
notion of risk leading people to accept more risk in their
interactions with the consultant.
A fourth, possible alternative explanation, is that people
possess cognitive schemas that describe how relationships
and intimacy evolves or should evolve in different forms
and stages of a relationship (Fehr, 2004; Miller & Read, 1991;
Rule, Bisanz, & Kohn, 1985; Schank & Abelson, 1977). New
encounters may activate schemas, which proceed to guide
further processing of information.People respond to the con-
formance or possible deviations from these schemas.This last
explanation resembles the mechanisms suggested here where
trust is seen as influenced by the congruence or incongruence
between an activated interpretive schema and social stimuli
(behavior).Where the explanations diverge are in the notion
of schemas as encompassing not only single events or behav-
iors but even the relationship and natural progression of such
events. Thus, Fehr (2004) shows through a series of studies,
how intimacy expectations influence people’s interpretation
of relationship events in same-sex friendships. Ruling out the
effects of cognitive schema on information processing is dif-
ficult. At the same time, the effects of schemas and of sponta-
neous responses to stimuli on trust may be thought of as
coexisting and do not necessarily constitute mutually exclu-
sive explanations.
Limitations and directions for
further research
The two studies have limitations that includeweakmanipula-
tions, mono-operations of behavior as an independent vari-
able, and a lack of tests of mediating mechanisms. The effects
of the manipulations on trust were weak. No significant
overall effect of time on trust was found in either of the
studies (5%). The lack of an overall significant effect of time
on trust may reflect the reality of the phenomenon studied.
Thus, trust may be resilient to change in the short run. But
weak effects may also reflect properties of the manipulation.
In the studies, in-role and out-of-role-behavior were each
represented with a single exemplar. The mono-operation of
independent variables according to Cook and Campbell
(1979) lowers construct validity because single operations
are likely to underrepresent constructs, as well as contain
irrelevancies that could influence the dependent variable.
However, increasing the number of treatments (by including
different sets of behavior) is likely to lead to either very large
samples or small cell sizes (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
The two studies test the relationship between variables at
the extreme ends of a causal chain. Mediating relations and
mechanisms described in the development of the hypotheses
were not tested. This leaves open questions with respect to
the causal interpretation of the findings reported here. The
ability of the risk to influence the form and mode of trust
development constitute a rationale for the model. Thus,
testing for the effect of risk on trust constitutes a necessary
but not sufficient first stage in a more complete test of the
model. Some findings however including the relationship
between the diagnosticity measures and change in trust are
consistent with the mediating mechanisms described in the
development of Hypothesis 2.
The studies also raise the more fundamental question of
whether these really study trust at all. An argument could
be made that the trust scores merely reflect people’s likes or
dislikes of the events reflected in the ratings (DuCharme,
1970). The studies described here then can be seen as forcing
people to evaluate these events in the form of trust, whereas
the same reactions could have been labeled with other con-
structs (Orne, 1962; Ray, 1984; Winkler, Kanouse, & Ware,
1982). Speaking of trust in relationship, to our findings
however, we argue, gives meaning for several reasons: First,
the trust scale consists of several items and people do differ-
entiate between these items suggesting that people are not
mindlessly applying a general evaluative response to the
nearest scale at hand. Second, people have been shown to
form judgments on the basis of very brief sections of infor-
mation (Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann, Spinath & Angleitner,
2004; Lutz & Lakey, 2001).Third, trust does constitute an
important element in people’s appraisal of other people in
the type of situations described. The role of trust in people’s
appraisal and evaluation of other people comes up in a series
of empirical studies of work relationships (Burt & Knez,
1996;Gabarro, 1990). Studies of situations involving conflict-
ing interests suggest that trust constitute an immediate and
salient issue in this type of interactions (Kramer, 1994;
Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).
Finally, convenience samples like the ones used for these
experiments raise questions about whether the findings can
be generalized beyond the actual samples used. Students are
likely to differ from the rest on the population on a series of
dimensions that may include work experience (low), age
(young), scholastic aptitude (high).Still; we do not consider
this a major disadvantage here for several reasons: First, our
primary emphasis here is on internal validity, not external
validity. Second, the samples, while drawn from a population
of students, differed in some important ways. Thus, one
sample consisted of part-time students that had considerable
work experience and who were currently working. The other
sample consisted of a more traditional student sample; full-
time students with little or nowork experience. This provides
us with some insight into the effect of work experience on
people’s reactions to the manipulations: a major concern in
the development of the experiments. Finally, selection was in
terms of classes, not individuals; very few students opted not
to participate in the experiment; hence, the problem of self-
selection was a minor concern.
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New studies should seek to improve our understanding
of the relations as well as rule out alternative explanations.
First, the weak effects of the manipulations in the two studies
suggest that new studies should be designed to elicit stronger
responses. Stronger stimuli could imply substituting written
manipulations with other stimuli that could include film,
photos, or role plays.Merely strengthening the content of the
written instruction may be counterproductive. If negative
outcomes become expected, participants may see little reason
to engage in processing of information about the trustee and
may instead resort to stereotyping and derogating the trustee
(Dépret & Fiske, 1999; Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, &
Graetz, 1990). Instructions involving no risk, on the other
hand, may cause participants to lose interest in the experi-
ment (Fiske, 1993). The latter may result in responses that
reflect highly general schemas as opposed to experimental
manipulations (Fiske &Neuberg, 1990).
Second; extensions and replications of the studies should
attempt to strengthen and validate the causal argument
behind the hypotheses. First, future studies may be designed
to test mediating mechanisms implied but not explicitly
tested in the current design, thus developing a causal chain of
events to substantiate the model. A series of mechanisms are
implied but not tested in the two studies. Thus, risk is sug-
gested to influence people’s construal of the situation in spe-
cific ways. Such implied effects could be tested by asking
participants to rate the situation on dimensions that may
include dependence or covariance of interests (Rusbult &Van
Lange, 2003).Themodel further specifies that risk will lead to
the activation of specific information goals and interpretive
categories. The relation between risk and selective schema
activation could be tested using implicit measures of schema
activation, including measures of response latency (Fazio &
Olson, 2003). Finally, the relation between schema congru-
ence and trust could be tested through experiments that
manipulate and measure congruence, fluency of processing,
subjective control, and trust. Such experimentsmay include a
common set of manipulations while testing effects on differ-
ent dependent variables (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).
Implications for practice
The suggested interpretation of the findings that people
respond to their experience of information processing and
the match or appropriateness of social stimuli to informa-
tional goals carries a series of practical implications: People
depend on other people’s trust in a wide variety of settings.
People’s initial impressions of consultants, salespeople, or
coworkers frequently influence the subsequent trajectory of
these relationships.Whereas previous contributions on initial
trust have highlighted the importance of initial categoriza-
tions, or stereotypes (McKnight et al., 1998), here we suggest
that initial trust may reflect the extent to which the behavior
and signals people convey in interaction match the informa-
tional goals and requirements the trustor have in a particular
situation. Our study is consistent with previous studies,
which show how affective priming may influence the forma-
tion of initial trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005) but differ in
that the affective effects are seen as originating from people’s
experience of information processing. As this situation
changes and people become more or less exposed to risk,
these goals and informational requirements are likely to
change, in turn affecting the effect of behavior on trust. This
suggests that people in ambiguous situations may benefit
from adapting their behavior to better fit the informational
goals of the trustor—for instance, a more trait-diagnostic
“personal style” of interaction may be better suited for a
trustor exposed to high risk, whereas a more constrained,
role-confined performance may be better suited for a trustor
exposed to little risk.
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